Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

State of Utah v. Carl Archie andrew, Amd Kenneth
Ervin : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.I. Daniel Stewart; Attorneys for the Amicus Curiae Utah
Affiliate American Civil Liberties Utah
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Andrew, No. 11158 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/90

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah .,
'fHE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

KENNETH WILLIAM ERVIN and CARt
ARCHIE ANDREW,

__

Defendant.a and
._

A~
,,

'

Defendants and Appellan1;$~~;,
~°16

Appeal from Judcmeat of Pm E·111&!1;1.l!lill

Juab County, Honorable C. N •

By: Robert Van Seiver

661 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Ut.ah
Attorneys for Defen1dalllt""A

~----------~~~VR~M~INS~P~R-~.~Ul.~~~~=RS~llllllllllllfllll~~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE-----------------···

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT -···-···-···-······· 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ---------------------·-···-····--·-- 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS·········-····················-··-····-········3
ARGUMENT ---·-··---------·-·... ___ ·-·-·-··-·--·-·--··-·····---····------····· 5
POINT I __________________ ............ ----·--··-···--·-·····-·-------------··-···------ 5
THE LINEUP WHEREIN THE IDENTIFICATIONS WERE MADE VIOLATES THE NEWLY
FASHIONED EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND
AN IN COURT IDENTIFICATION BASED
UPON SAME SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.
POINT II ---·------------···--------------·····------------··----··--··----···---····--9
CARL AR C H IE ANDREW'S CONVICTION
SHOULD BE VACATED AS THE EVIDENCE
DISCLOSED THAT HIS CONDUCT WAS SUCH
THAT HE WAS NOT AN ACCESSORY AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III ···-···--·-·-·-·····-·
--····--··-····---···-------·-····-···---··-··--·-··11
THE LINEUP AS CONDUCTED WAS SO INHERENTLY SUGGESTIVE THAT IT CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
15
CONCLUSION ·-···--·--··-----··-···--·····-···--·---·-···-···-·--··----··-···-·

CASES CITED
US vs. Wade, 1 CRL 3106, 388 US 218 ---·-··-··-·-··--·--·----·-- 6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued)

Page

Gilbert vs. California I CRL 3094, 388 US 263 ___________

6

Stovall vs. Denno, I CRL 3102, 388 US 293 ____________________

6

People vs. Caruso, 2 CRL 3135 (1968) ----------------------------

8

State vs. Bowman 70 P2d 459 -------------------------------------------- IO
People vs. Chadwick 7 U 134, 25 P 737 ________________________ 10
People vs. Martin 380 Ill. 328, 44 NE2d 49 ____________________ 13
People vs. Gold 361 Ill. 23, 196 NE 729 ---------------------------- 13
Palmer vs. Peyton 359 F2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966) ____________ 14

TEXTS CITED
3 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed 1940) Section 786 A
(B) 2 ___________________________ ---------------------------------------------

12

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 76-1-44 ----------------------------

9

Utah Code Annotated (Hl53) 76-1-45 ------------------------------ 10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
KENNETH WILLIAM ERVIN and CARL
ARCHIE ANDREW,

Case No.
11158

Defendants and Appellants.

Defendants and Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal case wherein the defendant
Kenneth v\Tilliam Ervin was found guilty of Assauit
with a Deadly Weapon with the Intent to Commit
Robbery and the codefendant Carl Archie Andrew
was found guilty as an Accessory to an Assault with
a Deadly Weapon with the Intent to Commit Robbery.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This matter came on for trial by Jury on the
25th day of September, 1967, in the District Court
in and for Juab County, Nephi, Utah, the Honorable
C. Nelson Day, Judge of the Fifth Judicial District,
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Presiding. The plaintiff and defendant offered evidence and argument to the jury and the same was
submitted for their decision and a verdict of guilty
rendered -:i_s to both defendants on both offenses.
On the 26th day of September, 1967, defendants'
counsel made a Motion of and for Judgment of
Acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and in the
alternative Motion for a New Trial. The Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal notwithstanding the verdict
was denied on September 26, 1967, and the Motion
for a New Trial continued until the 10th day of October, 1967, for argument and offering of evidence
by defendants. Said day was also the day set for
pronouncement of Judgment and Sentence.
On October 10, 1967, evidence in support of the
Motion was heard and after argument upon same,
was denied. The defendants were sentenced by the
Honorable C. Nelson Day with the defendant Ken·
neth William Ervin sentenced to the indeterminate
sentence as provided by law, at the Utah State
Prison of from five years to life.
The defendant Kenneth \\Tilliam Ervin moved
the Court for a Certificate of Probable Cause and ·
the same was granted and the commitment stayed
during the pendency of this appeal. Bond was
fixed by the Court in the amount of Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000.00) and the defendant Kenneth Wil·
liam Ervin ordered to reappear in execution of said ,
sentence at the conclusion of the appellate review.
The defendant Carl Archie Andrew was sen
tenced to serve a term of not more than five years
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in the Utah State Prison and the execution upon
same suspended and the defendant Carl Archie Andrew placed on probation.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek a declaration of this Court
that the lineup identification of defendants was a
denial of due process of law, reversal of defendanls'
convictions as a result of said denial, and if reversal
and retrial is ordered outlining said procedures for
Courtroom identification upon retrial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kenneth William Ervin, a 26-year-old male
Negro Computer Operator from Los Angeles, California, was bound for Rawlins, Wyoming, to visit
his mother, Theola Ervin. He left Los Angeles at approximately midnight on the 25th day of June, 1967,
and experienced car problems approximately 12
hours later three miles south of Levan, Utah (T pg.
160-162). He was assisted to the nearest gas station
located in Levan where the engine problem was
diagnosed as serious, whereupon he called his
mother in Rawlins. Wyoming, to assist him. Kenneth's mother, Mrs. Ervin, in the company of Carl
Archie Andrew and Mrs. Ervin's youngest son,
known as Dino, age 9, arrived in Levan at noon on
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the 26th day of June. Kenneth and Carl disconnect.
ed the drive shaft and chained the cars together for
the return trip to Rawlins, Wyoming. As they did
not have a chain to affix the cars together, they
rented one from a qas station operator by the name
of Von Rosequist (T pg. 151 lines 21-30) whose station was located in Levan, Utah. This served as the
source of identification leading to the eventual
arrest.
With the cars thus joined, Kenneth, Carl, Mrs.
Ervin, and her youngest son left Levan at 2:00 p.m.
on the 26th day of June, headed north toward
Rawlins. (T pg 168 lines 8-28). The towing car overheated and stops were necessary for water, but ths
trip was generally uneventful and placed them ir,
Salt Lake County later that afternoon between five
and six o'clock. (T pg 182 line 27 and pg 190 line 12).
On the 26th day of June at the approximate
hour of four o'clock, (T pg 34 lines 21-25), the ac·
cused allegedly entered the home of Gaydra Jackman located four blocks west of Highway 91 and
north of Nephi, Utah, five miles. (T pg. 32 lines 9-261
Mrs. Jackman was bludgeoned with a gun and rob·
bed of $7.00 and a wrist watch. (T p. 42-49). The per·
petrators of the offense remained in the Jackman
home until approximately 4:45 o'clock (T pg. 60 lines
27-30 pg. 61 lines 1-11) (corroborated at pg. 135 lines
10-18).
The defendants Kenneth William Ervin anc
Carl Archie Andrew were arrested in Rawlins, Wye
ming, on the 29 day of June, 1967, waived extradi
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hon and were returned to Juab County, Utah. The
defendants were interminately interned at the Juab
and Utah County Jails until August 6, 1967.
On July 5, 1967, a lineup was conducted (Tr
Motion for New Trial pg. 21 line 20), at the Utah State
Prison. Six men were in the lineup comprised of
the accused, two men of Mexican descent, and two
Negroes. (See Defendants' exhibits 1 and 2). The
victim, Gaydra Jackman, identified the defendants
from said lineup. The lineup was reproduced at the
time of trial (T pCJ. 75-83). The lineup was conducted
without the benefit of counsel (Tr of Motion for New
Trial pg. 15 lines 6 and 7 and pg. 18 lines 3-7 and pg.
20 lines 3-5 and pg. 30 lines 6-7). Counsel was appointed by the Court one month after the arrest of
the defendants. (Tr Motion for New Trial pg. 29 lines
24-25). The record is not clear, but the defendants
did not see counsel or talk to a defense attorney
until after the lineup. (Tr Motion for New Trial pg.
31 lines 10-14).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LINEUP WHEREIN THE IDENTIFICATIONS WERE MADE VIOLATES THE
NEWLY FA S H I 0 NE D EXCLUSIONARY
RULES AND AN IN COURT IDENTIFICATION
BASED UPON SAME SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.

The lineup, conducted at the Utah State Prison,
on July 5, 1967, was without the benefit of counsei.
The United States Supreme Court in the companion

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

cases of US vs. Wade. 1 CRL 3106, 388 US 218, Gilbert vs. California. 1 CRL 3094, 388 US 263, and Sto·
vall vs. Denno. 1 CRL 3102, 388 US 293, recog.
nized and used the Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel arguments in holding a pre-trial police lineup to be a critical stage of the proceeding and a
prosecutorial process to the extent the right to counsel attaches.
In recognition of the realities of the modern
criminal prosecution, the Court noted, the Sixth
Amendment guarantee has been construed as applying to "critical" stages of the proceedings. Hence,
in addition to counsels' presence at trial, the accused must be guaranteed that he need not stand
alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal. in Court or out, where the
counsels' absence might derogate the accuseds'
rights to a fair trial.
A confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim to illicit identification evidence is, in the majority's opinion, peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors that might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial. The grave potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, in the pre-trial lineup, and the
possibility that counsel can often avert prejudice
and assure a meaningful confrontation led the mctjority in those cases to the conclusion that a pretrial lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at
which the accused has a right to counsel.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
It is interesting to note in reviewing the transcript how much evidence was marshalled to implicate the defendants in the crime. No fingerprints.
or tire tracks, of the defendants' person or vehicle
were established. The defendant Kenneth Williar.i.
Ervin's coat was admitted in evidence and was allegedly one and the same coat as that worn by the
defendant while committing the offense. However,
as severely beaten as the victim was, no hair or
blood was found on the coat or any of the defendant's clothing.
A complete search was made of the defendant's
house and the objects that were stolen were never
located or recovered.
An examination of the victim's initial description (T pg. 61 line 15 to pg. 63) reflects the brief and
undetailed account by the victim of the perpetrators
of the crime. The victim's recollection was limited
to age, not in years, but only as to relative age between the two accused and to color of coats. (T pg.
61 lines 15-26), and color of skin or racial origin and
mustaches (T pg. 63 line 4).
A further review of the transcript reflects the
victim's inability to give any detailed information
about any other physical characteristic, mannerism,
or peculiarity. The alleged perpetrator of the crime,
Kenneth William Ervin, was in the house 45 minutes
and stood next to the victim and their respective
faces were six inches apart. (T pg. 41 line 31). But
yet, note her response to questions about her ability to identify him on cross examination. (T pg. 75
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line 5). At the lineup, compare the stccky Negro
who stood next to Kenneth William Ervin and determine if the physical similarities are such as to
render a test of her ability to identify a shame?
The one strong salient feature the victim recalled was the presence of mustaches on the perpetrators. None of the other men in the lineup had
mustaches and no inmate at the prison is permitted
to wear one (T pg. 81lines20-23).
The presence of counsel at the lineup would
have assured to the defendants an effective and
meaningful test of the victim's ability to identify.
Substantial prejudice to defendants' rights existed
in this confrontation and counsel should have been
present to avoid this prejudice.
A recent California Supreme Court case People
vs. Caruso, 2 CRL 3135 (1968) resolved the issue relative to basic unfairness at the lineup by advancing
a due process argument. Assuming this Court finds
an unfair lineup which may have resulted in a
tainted in Court identification even though previous
objection or invocation of an exclusionary concept
was not made, the convictions could be reversed,
as the lineup was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, Sto·
vall vs. Enno, supra. The Caruso case, supra, held:
"That its grossly unfair makeup deprived defendant
of due process of law."

The defendant herein advances the due process
argument as incorporated in the Utah Constitution
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Article 1 Section 7 and advanced by the Caruso
case, supra, and requests that this Court rule as a
matter of law that the recently propounded rules of
exclusion be invoked. The victim's testimony and in
Court identification should now be inadmissable or
the convictions vacated due to the lineup and resulting identifications as being so fundamentally
unfair as to deprive the appellants herein of due
process of law.
Not one shred of evidence connects the defendants with the commission of this crime except
the vague recollections of the victim whose identifications were formed and matured as a result of the
unfairly suggestive lineup held in the absence of
counsel.
POINT II
CARL ARCHIE ANDREW'S CONVICTION
SHOULD BE VACATED AS THE EVIDENCE
DISCLOSED THAT HIS CONDUCT WAS SUCH
THAT HE WAS NOT AN ACCESSORY AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

Carl Archie Andrew's conduct, was such that
he could not be an accessory after the fact, but
rather he should have been regarded as a principal.
The Utah Penal Code describes and defines a principal in 76-1-44 Utah Code Annotated (1953):
All persons in the commisison of a c.rime, either
felony or misdemeanor whether they d1~ectly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet
in its commission or,. not being present, having
advised and encouraged its commission, and all
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persons counselling, advising, or encouragin~ chil?-r~n under the age of fourteen years, lunatics or
1d1ots to commit any crime, and all persons who by
fraud, contrivance, or force occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to
commit any crime, or who by threats, menaces,
~ommand, or coercion compel another to commit
any crime, are principals in any crime so committed."

An accessorice is defined in Utah Code Annotated at Title 76. Chapter 1, Section 45 as follows:
"All persons who, after full knowledge that a felony
has been committed, conceal it from a magistrate or
harbor and protect the person who committed it,
are accessories."

It is appellants' position that one who is a principal cannot be an accessory after the fact. An examination of the record discloses that if Carl Archie
Andrew was present at all times during the offense
and as such was concerned with the offenses commission he was a principal within the meaning of
the statute. A person is an accessory after the fact
only after he has full knowledge that a felony has
been committed and then conceals that knowledge
from a magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged or connected therewith. State vs. Bow·
man, 70 P2d 459. People vs. Chadwick, 7 U 134, 25
p 737.
There is also authority that an accessory after
the fact and an accomplice are not as a matter of
law synonimous in definition and meaning by the
law of Utah. The two defendants in this case were
tried jointly. Carl Archie Andrew as an accessory
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after the fact as charged could not be tried with the
principal defendant, but if tried at all, he must have
been tried after the conviction, if any, of Kenneth
William Ervin. People vs. Chadwick, supra.
No evidence at any stage of the trial showed an
effort on the part of Carl Archie Andrew to conceal
knowledge from a magistro_te or harbor and protect
the principal, Kenneth 'William Ervin. The evidenca
disclosed that Kenneth vVilliam Ervin, Carl Archie
Andrew, Theola Ervin, and Stephen Randall Ervin
were travelling companions. However, assisting
Kenneth William Ervin to leave the scene of the
Jackman home is not harboring and protecting within the meaning of the statute, but rather the conduct
of a principal.
While it may be true that extenuating and mitigating evidence regarding the conduct of Carl
Archie Andrew was received it cannot alter or
change the character of his conduct. If Carl Archie
Andrew was at the scene of the offense, he was
posted as an observer or lookout for approaching
cars and to this extent aided or abetted the commis·
sion of the offense within the meaning of the statutory definition of a principal.
POINT III
THE LINEUP AS CONDUCTED WAS SO
INHERENTLY SUGGESTIVE THAT IT CONSTITUTED A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.

The lineup was preserved in this case due to
the unique restrictions imposed upon its partici-
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pants. Each were confined at the Utah Sta.te Pr~scj-1
at the time of the lineup and each were still confined at the time of trial so they could be reproduced for the jury's observation.
The jury's ability to observe permitted them to
discover its inherently suggestive nature. However,
the Jurors were not sophisticated and even though
they could observe, they did not appreciate the
lineup' s suggestive nature.
In discussing the technique of identification of
accused persons, Professor Wigmore in 3 Wigmore
on Evidence (3rd Ed 1940) Section 786 A (B) 2, comments:
"2. The process also calls for precaution in taking
measures beforehand objectively to reduce the
chances of testimonial error.
(a) At the time of original observation, the
investigator (police) should obtain from the
observer a note of any marks of the personality
observed, so that there will be less need to depend later on the observer's memory.
(b) At the time of presenting for recognition,
whether upon arrest or at trial in the courtroom, measures should be taken to increase ~he
stimulus of association and to decrease the nsk
of false suggestion. (a) The person to be identified should be clothed and placed (so far as
feasible) in the same conditions as when originally observed. (b) The person to be identified
should be presented in company with a dozen
others of not too dissimilar personalities."

The transcript reflects that selection, if any, of
the proposed participants was left to Warden Tur-
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ner and Utah County Sheriff Chappel. They apparently selected the personnel based not upon observation of the defendants so that similarities could be
matched, but by some vague description given over
the phone.
\AJhy the presence of persons of a different
race? (See Defendants' Exhibits 1and2). What power
of suggestion was present when the two men she
had to identify allegedly wore mustaches and the
only occupants of the lineup with mustaches were
the suspects? Why W9re the suspects the only two
persons in the lineup that fit the general description of the suspects?
Appellants contend that the lineup and identifications were made under conditions of unfairness
and unreliability. The State took unfair and prejudicial advantage of the accused in arranging the lineup.
The Supreme Court of Illinois had addressed itself to the subject of the manner in which identifications are conducted in the case of People vs. Martin
380 Ill. 328, 44 NE 2nd 49; People vs. Gold, 361 Ill.
23, 196 NE 729. In each instance as true with appellants herein the defendants were strangers with
the identifying witnesses. In weighing such evidence , the -Court stated that the matters to be considered were:
"The attendant circumstances, together with the
probability or improbability of an adequate opportunity for a definite identification."
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The Court concluded as appellants urge this
Court to conclude:
'.'Wh~r~ th_e conviction of a defendant rests upon an
identificat10n which is doubtful, vague, or uncertain
and which does not produce an abiding conviction
of guilt to a moral certainty, it should be reversed."

See the highly suggestive atmosphere and how
it developed and assisted in the identification in
Palmer vs. Peyton, 359 F2.d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). The
Court held that:
"The highly suggestive atmosphere that had been
generated could not have failed to affect her judgment."

The Court seemingly held that a police lineup
is essential for purposes of comparison and that
this
"Procedure fails to meet those canons of decency
and fairness established as part of the fundamental
law of the land."

No one will ever really appreciate or under·
stand Gaydra Jackman's power of observation, detection, and memory characteristics. The identification she made should have been the product of a
free, spontaneous, independent, and unpromoted
effort of an unaided mind. It was anything but that
type of selection. This identification appellants urge,
was suggestive and formulated her thought to the
extent that it left to her only the selections she made.
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CONCLUSION
The appellants respectfully submit that the
verdict and judgment as to each defendant should
be set aside as they were not represented by counsel at the lineup, the defendant Carl Archie Andrew
was a principal as a matter of law, and that the lineup was so unfairly suggestive as to be fundamentally prejudicial.
Respectfully submitted,
KARRAS & VAN SCIVER
By: Robert Van Seiver
661 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

